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J URISDICTION
This appeal is filed pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure as an appeal from, a final order from the Second Judicial District Court
nuci'i,' in o(inI'IIIIii iinim mi jaiHiian /m .'mu unci CIIICI 1:111 tn 111c court on Matin P<> . uu
(Add. K). The appeal was filed within the time pet: iod prescribed by Rule * ^ the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on March 26, 2010
ISSUES PRESENTED
*> hethc* UK- irial v on- erred in (is interpretation or application of Utah R. Ci\ P.
oinderoi Person^ lw.«Ai
>dndu;^ .n Review

'^Adjudication.

* -•* •'

iilmji, regarding Joiiul'i '

reviewed ior abuse of discretion. However, the court's interpretation oi Rule 19
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. USA Power, LLC et al v.
1 *acifi( 11/ /» 2010 1 1 1 31 ; 200801 ; 6 (I J I SC •).
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R. F. 28 p. 10064-iOiu^ ^Mcniu m Support of
Intervention), Add J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in
Kepi j din riainlilT f >pposilion to Inter \ ention R I ' 2C) p 104 I ,v I (I I-1 \
2. Whether die trial court erred in its interpretation or application of T Ttaf •
24 - Intervention
Standard of Review: Motions to intervene involve both questions of law and
fact Moreno \ Rii ofEihu Of Ionian School I hst, cr'"fi P?il KKfi MP {I Huh
1996). Legal rulings and conclusions are reviewed for correctness w ith no

1

deference. Mandatory Intervention under rule 24(a) turns on a legal
determination, which is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d
1074, 1077 (Utah 2000); Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement Dist v. Olds,
224 P.3d 709 (Utah 2009). The decision to allow Intervention as of right is
reviewed for correctness. M&S Cox Investments, LLC v. Provo City Corp., 169
P.3d 789 (Utah App. 2007).
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R. F. 28 p. 10064-10102 (Memo in Support of
Intervention), Add. J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in
Reply to Plaintiff Opposition to Intervention R.F.29 p. 10415-10443

3. Whether the trial court's determinations regarding Joinder under Rule 19 and
Intervention under Rule 24 are supported by any evidence and adequate findings
of fact.
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings must be sufficiently detailed and
include enough facts to show the evidence upon which they are grounded.
Findings of fact must show that the court's ruling follows logically from, and is
supported by, the evidence.
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R, F. 28 p. 10064-10102 (Memo in Support of
Intervention), Add. J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in
Reply to Plaintiff Opposition to Intervention R.F.29 p. 10415-10443

4. WhettiiT Hie liiitl v oil ill iTinii n\ ,i niiilhT oil \i\\\ h\ iu|iiiriny appdlaiil I >
. demonstrate that it will be bound b} tht* judgment in the existing case before
Intervention will be allowed under Rule 24, as recently amended.
Standard of Review : \ ti ial c: on i t's conclusions of la \ \ in the intei pi u -i >
Rules of Civil Procedure are review ed for correctness. "Correctness" means that
no particular deference is given to trial coi irt rulings of questions of lam See
Arbogast J i; amil) i,! 1 > ust i» Rivei Q ossings, L LC 2:38 I ,l 3d 1035 (I Jtah2010)

ti loinder of parties and to set aside judgment V \

M

* l-, 10415-10443

5. Whether iii^ n ial conr* erred as n rnntter oi Wi v* v (ailing to apply 7KII IV40 \

Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law in a civil case regarding
the interpretation of statutes are reviewed for correctness. "Correctness" means
that no |Miliuilii: -i •;..-. >

- •

See Estate of High-

^7 - w -» 238 i\2d 1089 (Utah Ann '"»

-

.i. « ^ .. . • ^

s

Preserved on Appeal. \«M I ? Supplemental Memorandum of I aw in smppon of
Motion In liikiu'iic 1"' I ,'K \\ Mil 'in 101 < I
6. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to grant appellants
motion to intervene.
Standard, of Review': A Motion to intervene involves questions of law and fact.
• Moreno <i V> PM KKl'i. KKX (I If.iii l<>%> I llur distil* ( uiHitll s iojji
determinations are reviewed for correctness affording no deference to its
3

' •

conclusions. Id. The district court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless
they are clearly erroneous. Id. "Mandatory Intervention under Rule 24(a) turns
on a legal determination which is reviewed de nova." Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074,
1077; Taylor-West, 224 P.3d 709. The decision to allow Intervention as of right
is reviewed for correctness. M & S Cox Investments, 169P.3d789.
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R. F. 28 p. 10064-10102 (Memo in Support of
Intervention), Add. J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in
Reply to Plaintiff Opposition to Intervention R.F.29 p. 10415-10443
ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
Appellant filed a "Motion for Intervention to Join Parties and Set Aside
Judgment/'1 together with a Proposed Answer to Appellee's Complaint and
Counter-claim,2 and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene.3 A
Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene based on
78B-6-403 UCA 1953 was also filed,4 which includes a ruling by Judge Allphin in

See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Motion for Intervention to Join Parties and Set Aside
Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum A ("Add. A") at R. F. 28 p. 10013-10052;
together with Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Rulings, attached hereto as
Addendum
T ("Add. T") R. F. 28 p. 9944-9946.
2
See Appellant/Dynasty Corp Proposed Answer to Appellee's Complaint and
Counter-Claim, attached hereto as Addendum B ("Add. B") at R. File 28 p. 1005310062
3
See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Intervene, attached hereto as Addendum C ("Add. C") at R. File 28 p. 10064-10102.
4
See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Intervene, attached hereto as Addendum D ("Add. D.") at R. F. 28 p.
10176-10178
A

CIMINO

" l" Hli lii1"! HI 1 ;> J! Ilhhni>\ Skv/nu b i tukh wm i \ 4\sih anion

1

Plaintiff

responded to Appellee's Motion and Memorandum in two responses: (1) "Plaintiffs
Opposition to Dynasty Corporations Motion to Join Parties and Set aside
judgmeiif ' iiiiiii I.1") '"PlninhlTs < >ppi>sili<Mi In I Hii;is.h f 'orporalmns IViolioiii lu
Intervene/'' ' Appellant filed a "Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Menu :«i indi 1m
in Opposition to Joinder of Parties and u* Set \ ^ide Judgment,"** together with
Appella 1:11' 5 "Memorandum in Kepi

* ,«wi;.;. :, . ^-.noranduiu in Opposition to

Intervention/'9 which was argi led <m Initial > 2U, ?(III (I f l" I "liiTcaftn n w irii I I 111
ruling denying Intervc«111 *»11 was entered,11

5

See Ruling, Judge Allphin U \ il L asc No. 9907001225 libeling v. Sk>park
Landowners Association, attached hereto as Addendum E C Add. f -") at R. !• 28
p.10180-10183
See Appellee/Plaintiffs Opposition to Dynasty Corp'. Motion to Join Parties and
Set Aside Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum F ("Add. F") at R. F. 29 p.
10306-10311
n

n

See Appellee/Plaintiffs Opposition to Dynasty Corp. Motion to Intervene,
attached hereto as Addendum G ("Add. G") at R. F. 29 p. 10314-10368
8
See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum
in Opposition to Joinder and to Set Aside Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum
H ("Add. H") at R. F. 29 p. 10415-10443
9
See Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition n
Intervention, attached hereto as Addendum I ("Add. I") at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514
10
See Transcript of Motion Hearing, January 26,1999, attached hereto as
Addendum J ("Add. J") p. 1109-1143 (Hearing resulting in denial of Intervention)
'See Ruling Denying Motion to Intervene and Join Additional Parties and Set
Aside Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum K ("Add. K") at R. V. 31 p.1093510937

STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
UtahR. Civ. P. 19: Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
a. Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose Joinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction
over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to
do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his
Joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
b. Determination by court whenever Joinder not feasible. If a person as
described in Subdivision (a) (l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party,
the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the
action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent
a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to
him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or

A

other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy
if the action is dismissed for non-joinder.
c. Pleading reasons for nonjoinder, A pleading asserting a claim for
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as
described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the
reasons why they are not joined.
d. Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
Utah R. Civ. P. 24: Intervention
a. Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an
unconditional right to Intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
b. Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to Intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a
conditional right to Intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or
defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a
governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order,
requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or
executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may
7

be permitted to Intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the Intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
c. Procedure. A person desiring to Intervene shall serve a Motion to
Intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The Motions shall
state the grounds therefore and shall be accompanied by a pleading
setting forth the claim or defense for which Intervention is sought.
d. Constitutionality of statutes and ordinances.
L If a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute in an action in
which the Attorney General has not appeared, the party raising the
question of constitutionality shall notify the Attorney General of
such fact. The court shall permit the state to be heard upon timely
application.
2. If a party challenges the constitutionality of a county or municipal
ordinance in an action in which the county or municipal attorney
has not appeared, the party raising the question of constitutionality
shall notify the county or municipal attorney of such fact. The court
shall permit the county or municipality to be heard upon timely
application.
3. Failure of a party to provide notice as required by this rule is not a
waiver of any constitutional challenge otherwise timely asserted.
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 78B-6-403
1. When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest, which would be affected by the
declaration, and a declaration may not prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the proceeding.

Q

2. In any proceeding, which involves the validity of a municipal or
county ordinance or franchise, the municipality or county shall be
made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard.
3. If a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid, the
attorney general shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and
be entitled to be heard,
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from the denial of a "Motion to Intervene; Join Additional
Parties and Set Aside Judgment,"12
Appellant, Dynasty Corporation ("Dynasty") owns property within Skypark
Industrial Park that is subject to assessment and burdened by certain restrictive
covenants applicable to all property owners in the Industrial Park.
In 1999, Dynasty commenced an action against the Skypark Landowners
Association seeking an order declaring that the 1979 CC&R's of the Skypark
Industrial Park had been amended by the action of property owners deleting
restrictive land use covenants and prohibiting the Property Owners Association from
changing any land use provisions. Dynasty's action was dismissed because all
persons affected by it had not been notified or joined pursuant to Section 78B-6-4-4
UCA.13
Shortly after learning that this action had been filed and tried, but before a
final judgment had been entered, Dynasty filed an action against Skypark Airport

12
13

Add. A at R. F. 28 p.10013-10023
Add D at R. F. 28 p. 10176-10179
9

Association ("SAA") seeking the opposite declaratory relief that SAA sought
against the "Gas Buster"14 defendants with the exception of enforcement if the
covenants were found not to be abandoned but on a uniform basis against all
landowners.15 The action filed by SAA against the "Gas Buster" defendants (this
action on appeal in which Dynasty's Intervention was denied) sought to enforce
restrictive land use covenants against the "Gas Busters" to prevent the sale of
aviation fuel and to prevent Charles Ward from conducting a helicopter business.16
Because of Dynasty's prior experience in having an action involving the
Skypark Industrial Park covenants dismissed for failure to join all parties,17 Dynasty
sought the Joinder of all landowners of Skypark Airport Industrial Park property
who were burdened by the CC&R's that SAA sought to enforce against the "Gas
Buster" defendants. Dynasty's motion to join, unlike either SAA's complaint
against the "Gas Buster" defendants, or the counter claim initiated by the "Gas
Buster" defendants, sought the Joinder of all other landowners who were in
violation of the CC&R's. In addition to landowners within the boundary of Skypark
Industrial Park, Dynasty also sought to join all landowners that SAA had allegedly
fraudulently assessed, pursuant to a 1985 CC&R document.
14

"Gas Buster" defendants include: Jay Jensen, Layne Barnes, Larry Clark, Peter
Lawson, Jim Roach, Peter Stevens, Andy Wallace, Charles Ward, Skypark L.C. the
property owners who were members of the Co-op known as gas busters who were
buying and selling aviation fuel to members of the Co-op.
15
See Complaint, Dynasty v. SAA, Civil No. 090700634, attached hereto as
Addendum
L ("Add. L") at R. F. 32 p.10168-11094
16
See Complaint, SAA v. Jensen et. al., attached hereto as Addendum M ("Add.
M") at R. F. 32 p. 10961-11049 (demand for relief paragraph 4 seeks general
enforcement
of restrictive covenants, not just fuel sales).
17
Add. E at R. F 28 p.10180-10183
m

Prior to filing the Motion to Intervene and Join Additional Parties in the "Gas
Buster" action, the court ordered the Joinder of all of the property owners in
Skypark Industrial Park, together with all property owners who had been wrongfully
•jo

assessed, as parties in the separate action commenced by Dynasty against SAA.
The motion was briefed and argued before Judge Page, the same judge who
previously joined all parties in the Dynasty v. SAA case, who denied the motion
because (1) it was not "timely filed," (2) "the interests of the parties seeking
Intervention was adequately protected by defendants," and (3) "the parties seeking
Intervention failed to demonstrate that they may be bound by the judgment in this
aetion."(Add. K)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On September 30,2009, Dynasty commenced an action in the Second District
Court against SAA (Civil No. 090700634).19 The action alleged that SAA had
made and collected fraudulent assessments against all property owners in the
Skypark Industrial Park, as well as other owners who had been fraudulently
assessed but were not owners within the Skypark Industrial Park, Additionally,
the action sought an Order declaring the restrictive land use covenants of the
1979 CC&R's burdening property within the Skypark Industrial Park to be
declared abandoned and void or in the alternative uniformly enforced.

See Order Joining Parties, attached hereto as Addendum N ("Add. N") at R. F. 32
). 11093-11101
9
Add. L at R. F. p. 10168-11083
11

2. In addition to commencing Civil No. 090700634, Dynasty sought an Order
joining all property owners subject to the CC&R's burdening the landowners of
the Skypark Industrial Park together with all landowners who had been
fraudulent assessed by SAA.20
3. Although Civil No. 090700634 was assigned to Judge Connors, the Order
Joining Parties was executed by Judge Rodney Page, who is the judge in the
action below.
4. The undisputed declaration of M.K. Ebeling, submitted in support of Dynasty's
Motion for Intervention, provides that Dynasty was not notified nor was it aware
that any action had been commenced by SAA against "Gas Buster" defendants
or any other person seeking to enforce the 1979 CC&R's of the Skypark
Industrial Park, or that a counter-claim had been filed seeking the return of
wrongful assessments until sometime after the jury trial had been conducted.
Had Dynasty been notified or otherwise made aware of the action, it would have
sought to Intervene at that time.22
5. Neither Dynasty, nor any of its representatives, was present at any meeting
where the litigation was discussed.
6. The undisputed declaration of Jerry R. Webber, a certified general appraiser with
an MAI designation from the Appraisal Institute, submitted in support of
20
21
22

Add. O at R. F. 32 p. 11090-11091
Add. P at R. F. 32 p. 11093-11102
See Declaration of M. K. Ebeling ("Ebeling Deck"), attached hereto as
Addendum
Q ("Add. Q") at R. F. 32 p. 11128-11130
23
Add. Q at R. F. 32 p. 11128-11130
1?

Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, indicates that "the strict and literal interpretation
of the Commercial Aviation covenants and restrictions have not been enforced/'
The ruling in this action "negatively affects every property subject to the
restrictions because the market is limited to non-commercial uses/' Had this
ruling been made "at the time I completed other appraisals, the valuation would
have most likely been adversely affected."24
7. The undisputed declaration of real estate broker Gabe Chadsey, submitted in
support of Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, provides that he was and has been
familiar with the restrictive covenants that impact properties within the Skypark
Airport project. Prior to the trial, an inspection of the Skypark property would
"cause any reasonable person to believe that the restrictive covenants precluding
aviation business at Skypark to have been ignored, abandoned, or waved." The
market for purchasers of Skypark property, in the event the covenants are
determined to be enforceable, "would be reduced by 75%." ... "That is to say
that people who are interested in purchasing property at Skypark Airport are
primarily interested in conducting aviation-related business." The practical
effect of the ruling determining the applicability and enforceability of the
restrictive land use covenants affecting the Skypark property impacts every

See Declaration of Jerry R. Webber ("Webber DecL"), attached hereto as
Addendum R ("Add. R") at R. F. 32 p. 11132-11133
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property subject to the restrictions because the market is limited to noncommercial uses/'
8. The issues core issues raised in the Dynasty v. SAA action26 (Civil No.
090700634) are identical to the issues of this action.27
9. Dynasty filed a motion with a "Proposed Answer to Appellee's Complaint and
Counter-claim/' seeking to Intervene as a defendant and to join all of the parties
who Judge Page had previously joined in the Dynasty action to this action.28
The counter-claim raised the issue of the return of the fraudulent assessments
that SAA had agreed to credit defendant in the settlement agreement29 but
because no other person was before the court, Judge Page had no jurisdiction to
order the return of any assessments to fraudulently assessed persons.
MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE
Facts supporting the courts legal conclusion set forth in its ruling denying
Intervention in Addendum K:
A. Dynasty Motion to Intervene was not timely filed:
i. Skypark Airport Association complaint v. Jensen et. al. filed Nov 13,
2002 (Add. M) R. F. 1 p. 1-93

See Declaration of real estate broker Gabe Chadsey ("Chadsey DecL"), attached
hereto
as Addendum S ("Add. S") at R. F. 32 p. 11135-11136
26
Add.
L at R. F. 31 p. 1016841094
27
Add. M at R. F. 32 p. 10961-11049 (Complaint of Appellee seeking the
enforcement of the 1979 CC&R's of Skypark Industrial Park); Add. B at 1005310062
28
Add. B at R. F. 28 p. 10053-10062
29
See Settlement Agreement (between Appellee and defendants), attached hereto as
Addendum T ("Add. T") at R. F. 28 p. 9946-9955
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ii. Answer and Counter Claim filed by Jensen et. al. January 17,
2003(Add. N) R. F. 1 p.95-110
iii. Jury Verdict made August 21,2009 (Add. U) R. F. 28 p. 9944-9946
iv. Motion to Intervene filed September 29,2009 filed 1 month following
jury verdict (Add. A) R. F. 28 p. 10013-10052

B. That "Gas Buster" defendants adequately represented Dynasty's interest:
i. Counter-claim filed by "Gas Buster" defendants alleging that the
restrictive covenants of the CC& R's were abandoned and waived (Add.
N ) R . F . 1 p. 95-110

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The Gas Buster defendants failed to adequately represent the interest of Dynasty
Corporation and the individuals and entities Dynasty sought to join as
intervening defendants in the Gas Buster action because the interests of the Gas
Buster defendants were not aligned with Dynasty's. Dynasty's interest in
seeking to Intervene was to preserve its property value and marketability, and to
ensure an equal playing field in the enforcement or waiver of the 1979 restrictive
land use covenants, while the interest of the Gas Buster defendants was only to
have the 1979 covenants declared waived and abandoned.
2. Dynasty Corporation's Motion to Intervene, Join Parties, and Set Aside
Judgment, although filed after a jury verdict, was filed in a timely manner.
Dynasty's declaration as to when it first learned of the action was undisputed.
Utah case law recognizes circumstances of entitlement and justification for filing
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Intervention later than my be considered timely on a strong showing of
entitlement and justification, or such unusual or compelling circumstances as
will justify the failure to seek Intervention earlier." Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d
495, 501 (Utah 2005).
3. The lower court failed to rule on the application of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 when it
failed to engage in a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the party sought to be joined
"has a sufficient interest in the action to make it a necessary party," and if it does
(2) is Joinder feasible? Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 145 P.3d 1146 (Utah
App. 2006), citing Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App.
1989). The failure to find that Dynasty and the parties it sought to join in the
Gas Buster action were necessary parties creates the likelihood of inconsistent
judgments, defeating the purpose of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 as discussed in
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978).
4. The court's interpretation and subsequent application of Utah R. Civ. P. 24
requiring a showing that the Intervenor will be bound by the judgment before
Intervention will be allowed, was based on a text of Rule 2f4 that had been
amended, and pursuant to Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 312 (Utah 1997),
now mandates Intervention on even more liberal terms than it did in Lima v.
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982).
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ARGUMENT
1. The court's finding that Dynasty Corporation's interests were
adequately protected by the Gas Buster defendants was legal error.
Dynasty Corporation, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 24, filed a Motion to
Intervene as of right, in an action commenced by SAA against Jay Jensen and others
(the "Gas Buster Defendants"). SAA v. Gas Buster defendants, the case at bar was
initiated by SAA to prevent the "Gas Busters" from selling aviation fuel. SAA was
seeking to enforce certain restrictive land use covenants against the "Gas Buster"
defendants that burden all Skypark Industrial Park land owners. Because Dynasty
believed that the restrictive land use covenants had been long since abandoned, it
was concerned that in the event the "Gas Buster" action determined the restrictive
covenants to be enforceable, its property value and the marketability of its property
would be negatively impacted and additionally in the event they were not uniformly
enforced if found not to be abandoned the same result would occur.
Dynasty Corporation does not sell fuel. Dynasty Corporation's interest is to
preserve its property value and marketability of its property and to secure and
maintain an even playing field regarding those issues with all other property owners
in Skypark Industrial Park who are burdened by the restrictive land use covenants of
the 1979 CC&R's of Skypark Industrial Park.
Dynasty Corporation's Complaint seeks a declaration finding the covenants
to have been abandoned or waived or requiring uniformity in the application of the
17

1979 land use covenants between all property owners who are burdened by them.
(Add. L) This is the reason Dynasty moved to join the parties it did and who are
joined in the pending action versus SAA by Dynasty Corporation.
The Complaint filed by Dynasty that joined all other property owners in this
action contains two causes of action:30
(1) seeking a judgment in an amount representing all unauthorized or
wrongfully calculated assessments made and collected
(2) seeking "an Order declaring said land use restrictions set forth in
Section IV of the 1979 Restrictive Covenants applicable to the
Skypark Industrial Park land owners, to be abandoned and waived and
to be of no force and affect or in the alternative entering an Order
declaring the entirety of said land use restrictions to be enforceable
and enjoining all parties from continuing any business or leasing or
allowing any business to operate on their property in violation of said
land use restriction of Section IV of Exhibit 1.
SAA's action against the "Gas Buster" defendants was a fight about aviation
fuel sales. SAA argued that it has arightto sell fixel in Skypark Industrial Park and
sought to enjoin the "Gas Buster" defendants from selling aviation fuel. The
instrument used by SAA to enjoin the "Gas Buster" defendants from selling fixel
was the restrictive covenants of the 1979 Skypark Industrial Park.31 SAA's entire
purpose was to stop competition between Gas Busters and itself.

30
31

Add.LatR.F.31
Add. L at R. F. 31 exhibit A to complaint restrictive covenants p. 10178-10185
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The "Gas Buster" defendants9 Answer and Counter-Claim challenged the
enforceability of the 1979 covenants claiming they had been long since waived and
abandoned. The counter-claim also challenged liens and certain assessments as
fraudulent and wrongful.32 Dynasty Corporation's interest and reason to challenge
and/or seek uniform enforcement of the 1979 restrictive land use covenants was and
is much broader and had nothing to do with fuel sales.
By ruling that the "Gas Buster" defendants adequately represented Dynasty
Corporation's interest, the court initially committed error when it failed to recognize
that the "Gas Buster" defendants totally ignored Dynasty's claim of wrongful
assessment against SAA. This was particularly apparent when the parties executed
the Stipulation for Resolution of Remaining Accounting Issues.

The trial record is

void of any evidence regarding the wrongfulness or amount of assessment made by
SAA and paid by Dynasty and the other property owners in the Skypark Industrial
Park.
It appears the lower court recognized this inequity when it realized it had no
jurisdiction to order SAA to return assessments to persons who were not before the
court, and thus executed Dynasty's motion to join parties in the ongoing action
against SAA.34 Clearly, had the "Gas Buster" defendants adequately represented
Dynasty's interest, it would not have been necessary for Dynasty to commence an
independent action and to join others in order for complete relief to be granted in the
H
Add. B at R. F. 28 p. 10053-10063
33
Add. T. at R. F. 28 p. 9946-9955
34
Add. P at R.F. 32 p. 11093-11102
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form of an order enforcing the restrictive land use covenants equally as to all
property owners and seeking the return of fraudulent assessments. The lower court's
ruling (Add U) applied only that portion of the restrictive covenants preventing fuel
sales and did not enforce the entirety of the restrictive covenant which provides:
No commercial aviation business, no fuel sales, maintenance or
mechanical business, air craft sale or leasing, charter services, or for hire
aircraft maintenance or mechanical services performed on airplanes or
aviation equipment kept or stored on the property. (Add. A (exhibit
1)1979 declarations)
Additionally, and as argued at the motion hearing,35 the court erred in ruling
that defendants had adequately represented Dynasty's interest, because the Dynasty
action was not only seeking an Order declaring the restrictive covenants to be
abandoned or waived it sought an order, in the alternative that in the event the
covenants are found to be enforceable, that the covenants prohibiting all aviation
business be enforced against all property owners, including the "Gas Buster"
defendants, who are in violation (Add. L) The issue that all property owners who are
burdened by the restrictive land use covenants be treated uniformly is at the heart of
Dynasty Corporation's interest in preserving its property value and marketability
(Add. R & S Declarations of Weber and Chadsy) The court's finding that the "Gas
Buster" defendants "adequately protected Dynasty's interest" is far too broad and
cannot be considered legally sufficient to establish adequate representation
pertaining to Dynasty's interest in preserving its property value and marketability
35

Add. J at 12-16 (Transcript of Hearing)
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particularly as it relates to uniformity in application as to all property owners
burdened by the restrictive land use covenants.
The record contains no evidence or discussion that property values or
marketability were considered or discussed by the "Gas Buster" defendants.
However, the record clearly establishes that SAA was operating both the airport and
Skypark Industrial Park when it came to assessments and enforcement of the
covenants, as a feudal fiefdom by accepting tribute in the form of solicited payment
from some land owners, demanding them from others in return for SAA's
agreement to waive or not enforce the restrictive land use covenants and even
demanding payment to avoid litigation enforcing the covenants.
Dynasty Corporation's interest is not totally aligned with the "Gas Buster"
defendants'. At the trial, the "Gas Buster" defendants' total interest and focus was
to challenge the restrictive land use covenants of the 1979 CC&R's in declaring
them waived, abandoned, and unenforceable. As indicated previously, Dynasty
does not sell fuel or operate a business that violates the restrictive land use

36

SAA had solicited payment for restrictive covenant waiver contracts contrary
to the provisions of the 1979 CC&R's from the following Precision AirPower, Hal Young Valley Fliers, James Hoddenback, Park City Helicopters
and Quality Aircraft Components; Exhibit A Add. I R.F. F. 29 p. 1044410514 ) and had threatened others with litigation unless payment was made
(Demand letter to Roach from counsel for Dynasty Exhibit 4 to Add. I). This
manner of doing business is contrary to the concept of CC&R's and is and
was against SAA's best interest to preserve a level playing field regarding
valuation and marketability among all property burdened by the restrictive
land use covenants.
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covenants. Dynasty's reason to challenge or seek uniform enforcement of the 1979
restrictive land use CC&R's is much broader.
Clearly, had Dynasty been allowed to Intervene, its interest in preserving the
property value and marketability of its property, along with all other owners of
property in the Skypark Industrial Park that it sought to join, would have been
represented. Likewise, the "Gas Buster" defendants did not represent or protect
Dynasty's interest in seeking the return of wrongful assessments that Dynasty had
been charged, together with all other property owners in Skypark Industrial Park by
SAA. The court's ruling that the "Gas Buster" defendants protected or represented
Dynasty Corporation's interest is clear error requiring reversal.
2. The Court's ruling that Dynasty's Rule 24 Motion was not
timely filed is not supported by fact and is erroneous.
Dynasty does not dispute that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 24, a "Motion to
Intervene" must be timely filed. Regarding the timeliness prong of Rule 24, other
than the court's biased statement of belief, without any finding that Dynasty
Corporation had notice of the litigation,37 there is no evidence to dispute the
declaration of M.K. Ebeling, Dynasty's owner, ("it is thus undisputed that Dynasty
had no knowledge or notice of the litigation until just prior to filing the Dynasty
action and Motion to Intervene").38

Add. K at R. F. 31 p. 10968-10968
Add. Q at R. F. 32 p. 11128-11130
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The court, without making afindingor receiving evidence or testimony of
the names and status of individuals attending any hearings conducted by the court,
opined that during this litigation "at each hearing 15-20 members who were either
parties to the litigation or those who occupied property at Skypark were in
attendance/'39 The court's opinion as to the identity of individuals who may have
attended the hearings evidently lead the Judge to a biased conclusion and belief,
again unsupported by any evidence contradicting the declaration of M.K. Ebling,
that Dynasty likely had notice of the litigation when the court indicated:
"With conducting the case during the last three years and presiding
over many hearings where 15 or 20 members, either parties to the
litigation or those who occupied property at Skypark, their various
different developments. The Court would find that although I do not
make that ruling, I find it very hard to believe that there are any owners
at Skypark that are not aware of this ongoing litigation."40
The time from which to file a motion to Intervene cannot equitably be
commenced to run without some evidence that Dynasty, as the Intervenor, had
notice of the action prior to the time it actually filed it. Because the court might find
it "hard to believe that there were owners at Skypark that are not aware of this
ongoing litigation," the court's belief alone cannot be considered evidence of notice.
Further, neither SAA nor "Gas Buster defendants" ever offered any explanation as
to why neither of them complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 19(c) by providing the names
39
40

Add. K at R. F 31 p. 10935-10938
Add. K at R. F 31 p. 10935-10938
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of all persons with an interest in the litigation and the reasons they were not joined.
SAA was clearly aware that there were other property owners in the Skypark
Industrial Park with an interest to determine the enforceability of the restrictive
covenants it sought to enforce against the "Gas Buster" defendants, but for obvious
reasons, primarily because SAA had been, for a fee, waiving the enforcement of the
covenants against certain property owners who were doing business in the Industrial
Park in clear violation of the restrictive land use covenants, it sought to enforce
against defendants.41
The issue of timeliness was briefed and argued before the lower court in
Dynasty's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene42 and Dynasty's
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Intervention"43
Contrary to the single statement of SAA that "Intervention is not to be
permitted after entry ofjudgment," relying on Parduhn44 With no discussion of the
factual circumstances of the case, SAA fails to acknowledge that the ruling in
Parduhn was made after afinaljudgment and appeal. More importantly, even after
afinaljudgment, the court indicated that "exceptions would be made on a strong
showing of entitlement and justification, or such unusual or compelling
circumstances as will justify the failure to seek Intervention earlier." Parduhn^ 112
P.3d at 501. The court's failure to consider the circumstances as to the reasons why
41

Waiver agreements of Precision Air-Power, Hal Young Valley Fliers, James
Hoddenbach, Park City Helicopter and Quality Aircraft Components. See: Exhibit A
to Add. I at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514
42
Add. C at R. File 28 p. 10064-10102
43
Add.
I at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514
44
Add. G. at R. File 29 p. 10314-10369
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Dynasty's motion to Intervene was not filed sooner was an abuse of discretion and
legal error.
Dynasty made a strong showing of entitlement and justification for filing the
motion to Intervene when it did because SAA and the "Gas Buster" defendants both
breached their Utah R. Civ. P. 19 obligation to notify the court of all other persons
who may have an interest in the action. The failure to comply with Rule 19
prevented Dynasty, and all other parties whose Joinder it sought, from receiving
notice of the action45 and has demonstrated that the judgment rendered, even though
Dynasty was not a party, had a negative impact on its property interest.46
Without evidence or a finding that Dynasty received actual notice, or
was somehow aware of the litigation, before the entry of a final appealable
judgment, it is legal error for the lower court to base its ruling denying
Dynasty's Motion to Intervene on the basis that it was not timely filed.
3. The denial of Dynasty's Utah R Civ. P. 24 Motion in
Intervention was based on an erroneous interpretation of law,
and disregarded the necessary party analysis of Rule 19(a),
designed to prevent inconsistent judgments*
Following oral argument on Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, the lower court
commenced its ruling denying the Motion by stating:
"The Court would find, first of all, as has been indicated by Counsel,
that in order to Intervene under Rule 24, it's necessary to show that the
{(1)} application was timely, {(2)} that the party had an interest in the
45
46

Add. O at R.F. 32 p. 11128-11130
Add. R at R. F. 32 p. 11132-11133; Add. S at R. F. 32 p. 11135-11136
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subject matter of the dispute, {(3)} that that interest was not
adequately represented, and that {(4)} they may be bound by that
judgment in the action." ("Ruling Denying Motion to Intervene and
Join Additional Parties and Set Aside Judgment."47
Thereafter, the court made the following findings:
"The Court would find that, first of all, this action was filed after the
jury verdict which was issued in June of this year. After many hearing
and Motions in regards to this matter, and rulings by the Court, the
Court would find that the filing of the request is untimely.
The Court would further find that given the history of this case, and
the evidence that has been presented by very qualified and adequate
Counsel over the years, there are no interests of this defendant that
were not adequately protected.
As Counsel for the Intervener has indicated, they have a right to
challenge whatever ruling was made in this matter, particularly issues
relative to any refund for assessments they may have paid.48 Based
upon that and the other aspects of the Court's ruling, the Court will
deny the Motion to Intervene and to set aside judgment/'49
The ruling of the lower court denying Intervention, based solely on Utah R.
Civ. P. 24 considerations of timeliness and adequate representation, failed to address
the core issue of whether Dynasty or the other parties whose Joinder Dynasty sought
were necessary parties pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). The issue of failure to join

47
Add
48

K, R. F 31 p. 10935-10938
Because the court denied Appellant's Motion to Intervene and join additional
parties, as a non-party Appellant fails to understand how it has a right to challenge
the rulings made by this court to declare the 1979 CC&R's invalid or to be awarded
judgment
against Appellee for fraudulent assessments.
49
Add. K,R. F. 31 p. 10935-10938
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a necessary party may be raised "at any time in the proceedings, including for the
first time on appeal." Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 208 P.3d
1077,1086 (Utah App. 2009), citing Cassidy v. Salt Lake County Fire Civil Service
Council, 976 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999). The failure to join parties indispensable
to a proper resolution of the controversy is grounds for dismissal of the action,
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Committee v. Thompson Michie
Associates, Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986), citing Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d
758 (Utah 1984), and can be raised at any time. Jennings, 208 P.3d 1077,1086.
To deny Dynasty's Motion of Joinder without a "necessary party analysis"
regarding Dynasty Corporation and the parties whose Joinder it sought is error.
In addressing the issue of whether or not a party is a necessary party, a court
must engage in a two-part inquiry; the first issue the court must consider is whether
the Intervenor or the parties sought to be joined "has a sufficient interest in the
action to make it a necessary party." Turville, 145 P.3d 1146, citing Seftel, 767 P.2d
at 945. In the event the court determines the party to be a necessary party and
Joinder is feasible, the second issue in will not be discussed, as it only arises if it is
unfeasible to join the necessary party. Turville, Id. In the "Gas Buster" action, it is
feasible to join all of the parties that were joined in the Dynasty action v. SAA.
The ruling in the "Gas Buster" case is void of any analysis of whether
Dynasty or any of the parties it sought to join were necessary parties and is
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inconsistent with the prior ruling by Judge Page that joined all the persons and
entities Dynasty sought to join in "SAA" finding that they were necessary parties.50
The inconsistent ruling granting Joinder as necessary parties in the action
commenced by Dynasty against SAA, where all landowners of Skypark Industrial
Park were joined as parties, but denying Joinder of the same parties in this, the "Gas
Buster" action, with identical issues and parties to be joined, creates the appearance
of inconsistent judgments that Utah R. Civ. P. 19 was specifically designed to avoid.
The court in Dynasty v. SAA could find the 1979 restrictive land use covenants to be
waived and/or abandoned, while the court in the Gas Buster action found them not
be waived or abandoned.
In Ruffinengo, the Court discussed the purpose of Utah R. Civ. P. 19. The
lower court granted summary judgment against plaintiff who had not been named as
a party in prior litigation and brought suit seeking to enjoin the construction of a
residence by enforcing restrictive covenants. The defendant challenged the standing
of plaintiff, even though plaintiff was a non-party, and further argued collateral
estoppel. The Supreme Court held that because plaintiff was not a party to the prior
action, plaintiff was not collaterally estopped from raising the same issues. The
Court further held that "it has long been established that if a general scheme for
building or development is intended by the original grantor, subsequent grantees
may bring action against each other to enforce restrictive covenants...." The Utah
Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment,
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considered defendant's estoppel argument that "if plaintiff were not estopped all
other lot owners could also sue and the burden of litigation and accompanying
expense would be enormous." The Court found the argument to have "no real merit
for he (defendant) needed only resort to Rule 19(a) to protect against such
eventualities," Ruffinengo, 579 P.2d at 344. The Court explained why defendant's
privity argument failed by indicating that "(1) It is not at all unforeseeable that
Ruffinengo might reach a different result than did the other lot owners in the prior
suit, simply because he may present a far different of convincing case. (2) This
Court has a consistent policy of resolving doubts in favor of permitting parties to
have their day in court on the merits of the controversy." Id. 344.
Likewise, the court failed to consider or address the requirement of Section
78B-6-403 UCA, which provides that when declaratory relief is sought "all persons
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration...." (See p.7 herein) This argument was made and preserved in the lower
court in Dynasty's Supplemental Memorandum of Law, where no written objection
or motion to strike was filed.51 As a matter ofjudicial economy, where an issue is
raised for the first time in a reply memorandum and where the issues could be raised
simply by filing a separate motion, the trial court has discretion to consider the
argument raised for the first time in a reply memorandum. Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d
1256 (Utah App. 2005), citing Trillium USA, Inc, v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37
P.3d 1093; Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 702 n.9 (Utah App.
51

Add. D at R. F. 28 p. 10064-10102
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1994). Failure to file a motion to strike constitutes waiver of any objectionable
material. Lister v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1994).
Although the court did not appear to have considered 78B-6-403 UCA, it is properly
considered on appeal as evidence that was before the district court. Thrasher v. B &
B. Chemical Co., Inc., 2 F.3d 995. C.A. 10 (Okl. 1993). Every property owner in
the Skypark Industrial Park whose property is burdened by the restrictive land use
covenants has an interest in the determination of the validity of said covenants.
The lower court's specific ruling denying Intervention was erroneous when it
addressed only two of the four elements it described as being required to grant
Intervention: (1) timeliness, and (3) Intervenor was adequately represented by
counsel.
4. It was error to deny Dynasty Corporation's Intervention
relying on cases that had been ruled on prior to the
amendment of Utah R Civ. P. 24.
Following argument on January 26th, 2010 as the court commenced to issue its
ruling andfindingon Dynasty's Motion for Intervention, the court made a general
statement of its understanding of the law that the Intervenor, pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 24, is required to demonstrate that it will "be bound by the judgment in the
action" before Intervention is allowed.52 This statement is a misstatement of law
and demonstrates the lower court's error in interpreting Utah R. Civ. P. 24.
Although the court did not appear to base its written denial of the Motion to
52

See Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Rulings, attached hereto as Addendum U
("Add. IT) at R. F. 32 p. 11085-11088

Intervene on this erroneous interpretation of the law, it clearly demonstrates the
possibility and likelihood that it did.
The court erroneously adopted the interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 24 as
argued by SAA in its Memorandum in Opposition to Intervention, citing Parduhn
and Lima.53 Clearly, the court did not consider Dynasty's Memorandum in Reply
to.... 54 identifying that Utah R. Civ. P. 24 was amended following Parduhn and
Lima. Cases following the amendment to Utah R. Civ. P. 24 after Lima and
Parduhn have held that "Instead of requiring applicants to show that they will be
"bound by a judgment in the action," the rule now requires applicants to
demonstrate only that "the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede (their) ability to protect that interest... Thus, the text of Utah R. Civ. P.
24 now mandates Intervention on even more liberal terms than it did when we
issued Lima. " Chatterton, 938 P.2d at 312.

CONCLUSION
Dynasty Corporation, like all property owners in the Skypark Industrial Park,
has an interest and purpose to preserve the marketability and value of its property
and to ensure that restrictive covenants are fairly and consistently enforced. Indeed,
one of the stated purposes in enacting the CC&R's, as set forth in Exhibit 1
describing the purpose of the declaration at subsection (a) provides; protects the
owners and occupants of building sites such use of neighboring building sites as
53
54

A d d . G a t R . F . 2 9 p . 10314-10369
Add. I at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514
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might depreciate the value of their property.. ."55 Dynasty Corporation sought to
protect that interest after learning of the Gas Buster action commenced by SAA by
first filing an action against SAA seeking the exact opposite relief sought by SAA in
the Gas Buster action, and secondly, by filing a Motion to Intervene, Join additional
parties and set aside the Judgment that had been entered.
The court's denial of Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, Join additional parties
and set aside the judgment because Dynasty's Motion was not timely filed and
further because defendants adequately protected the interest of Dynasty Corporation
was error, effectively denying Dynasty and all parties it sought to join, the rights to
participate and protect their property interest as provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 19 and
24 and as required by 78B-6-403 UCA 1953 regarding declaratory judgments.
For the foregoing reasons the ruling of the lower court denying Intervention
should be reversed.

DATED this 5th day of November 2010.
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